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Abstract 5 
In this paper, we use science studies to elucidate the nature of advisory science in the context of 6 
disasters, particularly those involving geophysical hazards. We argue that there are some key 7 
differences between disaster advisory science and the issues that are most discussed in Science 8 
Studies: they are both time- and space- specific and they constitute major social, economic, and 9 
scientific shocks. We suggest that disasters require flexible advisory structures that maximise the co-10 
production of science and social order, and present a framework for this. We argue that the aim of 11 
increasing resilience to natural hazards requires that sociology of scientific knowledge play a part in 12 
the application of scientific advice: disaster studies has focussed on the reduction of vulnerability as 13 
a reaction against technical-rational models of scientific advice, but in doing so has restricted the 14 
potential role of the social sciences in the framing of scientific advice and expertise.   15 
Introduction 16 
In November 2012, an Italian court found six scientists and a local official guilty of manslaughter for 17 
misinforming the public about seismic risk in L’Aquila, where a devastating earthquake occurred on 18 
6th April, 2009. This verdict was received with much concern in the scientific community, with many 19 
organisations condemning it as detrimental to the willingness of scientists to act as policy advisors – 20 
an increasingly important part of their work (e.g. Marzocchi, 2012). The verdict reflects on a 21 
breakdown in the risk communication process – perhaps, as some have alleged, because of political 22 
interference in the advice that was given (Hall, 2011). Other shortcomings appear to have been a 23 
lack of transparency, a failure by the scientists and officials to regard the public as an intelligent 24 
entity, and the absence of adequate governance structures with clear remits (see Alexander, 2010 25 
and 2013a for detailed critiques of the disaster management policies in Italy).  26 
There are also important lessons from L’Aquila regarding the positionality of scientists in disasters. 27 
This is particularly relevant to geophysical hazards (defined here as earthquakes and volcanic 28 
eruptions), since the level of uncertainty involved in the management of their associated impacts is 29 
very high and there is heavy dependence on scientific advice, sometimes over periods of decades 30 
(e.g. Donovan et al., 2013). By one estimate, the probability that the small earthquakes preceding 31 
the L’Aquila earthquake were foreshocks (i.e. would be followed by a larger earthquake) was less 32 
than one percent (Marzocchi, 2012). Such events were discussed in the UK Government’s Blackett 33 
Review of High Impact Low Probability Risks (Government Office for Science, 2011), which placed 34 
strong emphasis on the involvement of external experts in the policy process. In extreme events, 35 
however, advisory committees may be formed ad hoc (e.g. Donovan et al., 2013; Newhall and 36 
Punongbayan, 1996; Aspinall et al., 2002), and their remit and responsibilities may not be well 37 
defined. Furthermore, as demonstrated in Italy, the legal responsibilities and accountabilities of 38 
scientists are problematised (e.g. Marzocchi, 2012; Aspinall, 2011). While scientists have generally 39 
condemned the verdict, there are also disagreements about “best practice” both within seismic 40 
hazard assessment (notably between advocates of probabilistic analysis and those who prefer 41 
deterministic methods) and in the act of providing scientific advice.  42 
These debates highlight a critical issue that is frequently overlooked or understated in the disaster 43 
studies literature: the diverse mechanisms, institutions and epistemologies involved in the provision 44 
of scientific advice and its integration with local knowledge, particularly in the context of high 45 
scientific and social uncertainties, can exacerbate disasters if they are not clear from the outset. The 46 
Italian case has highlighted the vulnerability of experts when both uncertainty and the stakes are 47 
high. It has demonstrated the pivotal nature of the relationships between expert advisors and social 48 
and political structures in emergencies and demonstrated that these can be significantly disordered 49 
and reordered by the activity of the Earth, with costly social consequences. This can extend the 50 
recovery time post-disaster, and understanding these relationships may aid future disaster risk 51 
reduction.  52 
The murky epistemological status of advisory science has been addressed in the Science Studies 53 
literature in the context of the co-production of knowledge by science and society (e.g. Jasanoff, 54 
2004; Doubleday, 2007). The co-production idiom is able to negotiate between the social 55 
construction of science and the realist view of science, by examining the ways in which knowledge 56 
production is linked to its context. Co-production has local echoes; it is closely tied into grounded 57 
practice and governance systems (Jasanoff, 2004, 2005). In response to risks, particularly low 58 
probability, high impact risks, the process of knowledge production changes as a result of sudden 59 
societal need, requiring intense collaboration between scientists and society (both political officials 60 
and the public). This is one of the key challenges in managing sudden-onset natural crises such as 61 
earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, and depends on institutional structures, relationships between 62 
different groups and the development of the crisis as defined by the earth system.  63 
Accepting that the natural and the social world are produced together requires new approaches to 64 
the understanding of “knowledge”. In her 2005 work, Designs on Nature (Jasanoff, 2005), Sheila 65 
Jasanoff presents the concept of “civic epistemology”: 66 
Civic epistemology refers to the institutionalised practices by which members of a given society test and 67 
deploy knowledge claims used as a basis for making collective choices...these collective knowledge-ways ... are 68 
distinctive, systematic, often institutionalised, and articulated through practice rather than in formal rules 69 
(p255). 70 
Jasanoff presents a framework through which different cultural knowledge-ways can be examined 71 
and analysed, using examples from biotechnological discourses in the UK, US and Germany. She 72 
analyses six “dimensions” of civic epistemology – styles of public knowledge-making; public 73 
accountability; public demonstration; objectivity registers; expertise; and the visibility of expert 74 
bodies. Each of these dimensions reflects some aspect of the culturally derived epistemic basis for 75 
the social application of scientific knowledge. These tests and evaluations of knowledge claims 76 
intensify when a new type of threat faces a population imminently. In this situation, pressure on 77 
scientific advisors can be intense, and attempts may be made to promote a “linear model” approach 78 
to scientific advice (e.g. Marzocchi et al., 2012), in which the role of scientists is, in theory, clearly 79 
delineated. As sociologists of scientific knowledge have shown, however, this “boundary work” 80 
(Gieryn, 1983) is not straightforward, because the distinctions between science and non-science are 81 
not obvious – especially in policy contexts. For example, scientists in policy contexts have to make 82 
judgements about issues that would not normally concern them in a laboratory setting. They have to 83 
take incomplete and uncertain knowledge and produce a coherent answer to a socially relevant – 84 
not necessarily scientific – question. In a crisis, this is affected by pressures that are external to 85 
scientific process – such as the need to make evacuation decisions. The testing of knowledge claims 86 
under these circumstances are intensified prior to any event that may occur in the natural system, 87 
and may have considerable influence over subsequent responses to scientific advice. In a volcanic or 88 
seismic crisis, the timescales usually available to scientists for their own testing of knowledge are 89 
much shorter, so the uncertainty is very high, but at the same time, the advice is desperately needed 90 
by authorities. In this paper, we present a new framework, based on co-production, for approaching 91 
the civic epistemology of disasters. This analysis is based on review of the scholarly literature, and on 92 
scientific and policy reports where specified. 93 
Initially, we examine the relationship between resilience and scientific advice, drawing on the 94 
disasters literature. We then summarise the key tensions that dominate when scientists are asked to 95 
provide advice under uncertainty, as they seek to construct authority around incomplete knowledge. 96 
We argue that scientific advice in environmental crises can, in some cases, be conceptualised as a 97 
“civic epistemological rupture”: an event that changes the position and relationship between 98 
scientific advisory practice and the public in a specific time and place. In particular, we suggest that 99 
apparent obstacles to “pure” science in the process of risk assessment and management may be 100 
overcome by structured, civic epistemological framings and aid the co-production of social order in 101 
the disaster management process (drawing on the work of Sheila Jasanoff, 2004, 2005,2010). Studies 102 
have shown that scientific advice in volcanic crises, for example, is subject to and penetrated by 103 
similar social, political and economic considerations as scientific advice in other contexts (Donovan 104 
and Oppenheimer, 2014, 2015; Fearnley, 2013; see also for example Owens, 2005; Jasanoff, 2005). It 105 
is, however, more time-critical in environmental crises than it is in relation to biotechnology or 106 
nuclear technology – and the timescale is set by the natural environment. For effective reduction of 107 
disaster impacts, consideration must be paid to the institutional and epistemological framings of 108 
expert advice, as well as to the more common issues of public education and planning. We present a 109 
framework that aims to contribute towards a civic epistemology of disaster science. 110 
Scientific advice and increasing resilience: Why do we need a 111 
framework? 112 
Disasters have been framed as “windows of opportunity” (e.g. Birkmann et al., 2010) and “catalysts” 113 
(e.g. Kreps, 1998). White (1945) noted that while natural hazards may be “acts of God”, losses as a 114 
result are “largely acts of man”. Hewitt (1997) identified the dangers of depending on scientific and 115 
technical approaches to disaster management, focusing instead on disasters as social processes and 116 
the reduction of social vulnerability. This approach has dominated disasters literature in recent 117 
decades (e.g. Cutter 2003; Wisner et al., 2004, 2011; Smith, 2001; Hewitt, 2013): the concept of a 118 
“natural disaster” is a contradiction in terms. Recent literature has also adopted the ecological 119 
concept of “resilience” as a means of understanding the ways in which societies deal with disasters 120 
(e.g. Adger et al., 2005; Paton, 2006). While critical, the focus on community resilience and 121 
vulnerability has arguably coexisted with a neglect of the role and nature of scientific advice in 122 
disaster management – and this is the topic we seek to address in this paper. In the case of seismic 123 
and volcanic risk assessment, the importance and difficulties – shown at L’Aquila – of applying 124 
world-class science to the problems should not be underestimated (Tilling, 2008; Gaillard and 125 
Mercer, 2013), even though it is a small part of the overall picture of disaster risk reduction (DRR).   126 
The UN ISDR defines resilience as follows: 127 
‘The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to 128 
and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the 129 
preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.’ 130 
Resilience in this definition is thus closely tied to adequate governance and resources, and to the 131 
preparedness of local people (Paton, 2006; Paton and Johnston, 2006). However, the use of the term 132 
has become so widespread that its meanings are increasingly difficult to reconcile, particularly when 133 
combined with other Disaster Risk Reduction terms (such as vulnerability, capacity and exposure; 134 
e.g. Manyena, 2006; Alexander, 2013b, Lewis and Kelman 2010; see also Adger, 2006 and Gallopin, 135 
2006). Alexander (2013b) suggests that the term has the potential to remain useful as long as its 136 
limitations are recognised – particularly when it is applied to complex social systems. Resilience can 137 
be used to theorise the process of disaster risk reduction, but it cannot describe it in its entirety. It 138 
offers insight into the processes of recovery and the factors on which they depend. The resilience of 139 
a society to a hazard depends on the pre-disaster infrastructure and on adaptive capacity (e.g. 140 
Pelling and High, 2005; Gaillard, 2007), and on the nature of the hazard and its impacts. The ability of 141 
critical systems to adapt to the changing circumstances can have a significant impact on the recovery 142 
process (e.g. Gaillard, 2007; Handmer, 2003). This includes the ease with which expert advice can be 143 
located and integrated into disaster risk management. 144 
Wisner et al (2012) and Gaillard and Mercer (2013) developed a road map for disaster risk reduction. 145 
They identified three strands of DRR: risk assessment, dialogue and action. In each of these, the 146 
integration of local and scientific knowledges was highlighted. In the case of extreme hazards, 147 
however, where uncertainty is high, knowledge claims can become contested very rapidly and this 148 
whole process changes the nature of knowledge generation and management in a local, social 149 
context. There may be interaction between the risk assessment process and the processes of 150 
dialogue and even action within the helpful scheme of Gaillard and Mercer (2013): risk management 151 
is not in practice a linear progression. Social and political complexities affect scientific knowledge 152 
production, especially under uncertainty. While it is critical that scientists do interact with local 153 
communities prior to hazard realisation to maximise the integration of local and scientific 154 
knowledges, it is also important to note that the role of science in disaster management may also 155 
involve the negotiation of very high levels of uncertainty in the risk assessment process, alongside an 156 
anticipation of public response. This requires a consideration of epistemological issues that arise in 157 
risk assessment and in its integration with policy – something that is significantly aided by taking a 158 
co-production approach. Stakeholders may demand information on the evidence behind policies, for 159 
example, as was witnessed in the 2010 ash crisis in Europe when airlines questioned the necessity of 160 
airspace restrictions (e.g. Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2011). These issues involved uncertainty 161 
concerning scientific models and observations, as well as expert opinion. The time-critical nature of 162 
these processes during a crisis necessitates careful planning on the part of scientists and 163 
practitioners. In the next section, we discuss some insights into the science-policy process that have 164 
been made in other fields that are less time-dependent than our context. In doing so, we draw on 165 
the Science Studies literature and on perspectives from the philosophy of science. 166 
Civic epistemological ruptures: A framework for DRR 167 
Scholars in Science Studies have examined the interface between science and policy in a range of 168 
fields (e.g. Collins and Evans, 2007; Jasanoff, 2004, 2005, 2007; Nowotny et al., 2003; Brown, 2009; 169 
Fischer, 2010). Geographers of science have also discussed science and policy, particularly in relation 170 
to environmental knowledge controversies (e.g. Lane et al., 2011; Whatmore, 2009) and field 171 
stations (Powell, 2007). The combination of disaster studies and Science Studies enables an 172 
interrogation of the practice of science in particular places at particular times, examining its social 173 
context, methods and identity. It can contribute to policy making through the identification of the 174 
themes and patterns that emerge from such studies and that may provide insights for future 175 
planning. In the context of disaster research, this is critical in the building of resilience to manage 176 
future events. Risks from natural hazards are spatially constructed (Hewitt, 1997, 2013; November, 177 
2004, 2008; Wisner et al., 2004; Pelling and High, 2005; Pelling and Dill, 2010), and the interaction 178 
between physical and human factors is complex: risk both transforms and is transformed by spaces 179 
(November, 2008). Indeed, attempts to quantify and assess risks do themselves have an impact on 180 
the way that risk is framed in a social context (e.g. Haynes et al., 2008), and social context can have 181 
an impact on the ways in which risk assessment is carried out, as scientists try to anticipate the 182 
critical social questions.  In individual cases, the importance of the experience, judgement and 183 
political awareness of scientists in the advisory process has been demonstrated repeatedly (e.g. Hall, 184 
2011; Haynes et al., 2008). The growing reliance on subjective risk assessment methodologies such 185 
as expert elicitation demonstrate the liminal nature of the policy interface – and can present 186 
challenges for the philosophies of individual scientists (e.g. Castanos and Lomnitz, 2002; Aspinall, 187 
2012; Donovan et al., 2012b,c). The concept of boundary work is important here (Gieryn, 1983). 188 
Scientists have been observed to attempt to delineate their work from that of policymakers using a 189 
range of tools, including the rhetoric of objectivity and the use of quantitative assessments. In 190 
practice, however, the “boundary” between science and policy is leaky (Owens, 2005; Owens et al 191 
2006; Eden et al., 2006; Lovbrand, 2007; Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2014  192 
Gaston Bachelard argued that “science is the aesthetic of the intellect” (1938:21), and that many 193 
aspects of the human mind conspire to taint the pursuit of “objective” knowledge. He refers to these 194 
as “epistemological obstacles” – these hinder the breakthroughs in scientific discovery that are 195 
referred to as “epistemological ruptures”; and “epistemological acts” are processes that aid such 196 
ruptures1 (see also Althusser, 1969 and Foucault, 1969, for other uses of these terms). He offers a 197 
psychoanalytical approach to understanding objective knowledge, noting that the primary obstacle 198 
to the progression of scientific thought is common sense. At the crux of these discussions is a 199 
contestation of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity: it is the humanity, feelings and 200 
impressions of the individual that present an obstacle to scientific progression (Bachelard, 1938). In 201 
contrast, scientific advice frequently depends upon such impressions: scientists’ judgements are 202 
based on their expertise but are inevitably subjective and may also depend on context (social and 203 
scientific). This liminal science may be uncomfortable and result in those participating being self-204 
selecting. It may challenge accepted scientific methods and be forced to apply untested techniques 205 
in the service of social need. However, this can also lead to breakthroughs both in the practice of 206 
science and in its societal role (e.g. Donovan et al., 2012a; Sparks, 2007). Aspects of the psyche that 207 
Bachelard considered to be a hindrance to the progression of science (“epistemological obstacles”) 208 
may actually help the progression of scientific advisory practice. For example, recent work has 209 
emphasised the importance of embracing subjectivity in science (O’Brien, 2010; Curtis, 2012). From 210 
a different perspective, the widely used method of “scenario planning” (Ringland and Schwartz, 211 
1998; Alexander, 2000; Lindgren and Bandhold, 2002) requires a level of expert imagination – 212 
something also considered an obstacle by Bachelard. 213 
Reading Bachelard through the lens of the last thirty years of research, we could surmise that 214 
understanding the relationship between the self – complete with impressions, imaginings and 215 
interpretations – and the “object” in nature is at the heart of negotiating uncertainty in scientific 216 
advice. This is the foundation of the co-production idiom, and hints at its usefulness in bringing 217 
together the social and physical sciences. It is the expert self that has to straddle the uncertainty-218 
                                                          
1
 Volcanic eruptions can, therefore, be epistemological acts through the advances that come about through 
the rapid acquisition of volcanological knowledge that results from them (e.g. Baxter, 2008; Donovan et al., 
2013). 
ridden boundary between knowledge and advice – a social experience that requires social scientific 219 
analysis. Experts have to interact both with peers and with “lay people” – including local officials and 220 
populations. Bachelard viewed epistemological ruptures as positive: they advance human learning. 221 
We suggest that extreme events such as volcanic eruptions, large earthquakes and other high 222 
magnitude hazards can produce civic epistemological ruptures: they change the course of knowledge 223 
production at the science-society interface, through shared experience and learning. If this occurs 224 
efficiently, it will facilitate resilience as a part of adaptive capacity. If it fails and information is 225 
disputed, unclear or unavailable, response to the hazard will be similarly delayed and confused as 226 
expertise is assembled ad hoc.  227 
The trial of six seismologists and a public official in Italy can be read as a civic epistemological 228 
rupture: it has shaken the ways in which scientists think about providing advice and it has brought 229 
the relationships between scientists and society in a particular place to light. In the next section, we 230 
discuss the events in more detail, focussing particularly on the wider scientific response, in which 231 
senior scientists and scientific institutions reactively strongly and quickly to a complex situation in a 232 
way that was itself not at all ‘scientific’ (Alexander, 2014). We show that many of the debates about 233 
L’Aquila in the broader scientific community revolve around the establishment of authority – the 234 
authority of “science”, and also of particular people who practise it. This attempt to establish 235 
authority works against science because it resists the ideas of co-production and civic epistemology. 236 
Events at L’Aquila and the construction of authority 237 
The trial, sentencing and subsequent acquittal of six seismologists on the Major Risks Commission in 238 
L’Aquila provoked a very wide range of responses. Scientific institutions condemned the verdict. 239 
Some examples: 240 
“It is thus incorrect to assume that the L'Aquila earthquake should have been predicted. The charges 241 
may also harm international efforts to understand natural disasters and mitigate associated risk, 242 
because risk of litigation will discourage scientists and officials from advising their government or 243 
even working in the field of seismology and seismic risk assessment.” American Geophysical Union 244 
(AGU) 245 
“They are clearly all eminent scientists with many years of experience in their expert fields, not 246 
novices. To charge these scientists with criminal neglect is unconscionable. The scientists did not 247 
cause the earthquakes, they could not prevent them, nor could they predict them, so how could 248 
they be guilty of manslaughter? This is a farce and they have been made scapegoats.” International 249 
Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth’s Interior (IAVCEI) 250 
"We are deeply concerned. It's not just seismology which has been put on trial but all science," 251 
Charlotte, Krawczyk, Seismology division at the European Geosciences Union (EGU) 252 
“This trial has raised huge concerns ... Because here you have a number of scientists who are simply 253 
doing their job being accused of criminal manslaughter”. Tom Jordan, Southern California 254 
Earthquake Center (SCEC) 255 
“The charges against these scientists are both unfair and naive. The basis for those indictments 256 
appears to be that the scientists failed to alert the population of L’Aquila of an impending 257 
earthquake. However, there is no way they could have done that credibly.” American Association for 258 
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) 259 
“When serving on high level advisory panels for governments and authorities, scientists have the 260 
duty to provide the state of knowledge in a comprehensive and unbiased fashion, to enable 261 
authorities to take the required mitigation actions. This cannot be achieved under the threat of 262 
public prosecution. A negative impact of this trial and sentence will be to make scientists reluctant to 263 
serve on risk advisory commissions or express expert opinions. “ International Association of 264 
Seismology and Physics of the Earth’s Interior (IASPEI) 265 
These comments hold within them several latent views about scientific advice: that reputation 266 
(“eminent scientists”) is a major source of authority; that this specific incident is a trial of “all 267 
science”; that scientists on advisory panels are “unbiased”; and that science is beyond reproach. 268 
These reactions betray a positivist view of scientific knowledge and authority, much like that 269 
championed by Bachelard. The trial was widely misread as a trial of science, as has been noted by 270 
several commentators (e.g. Hall, 2011; Alexander, 2014; Yeo, 2014). The problem was that the public 271 
were reassured by a local official (also sentenced to jail time, though this has since been reduced at 272 
appeal) that there was a “favourable situation” because the small earthquakes were releasing the 273 
stress on the faultline. This was presented as the scientific viewpoint. On 31st March 2009, a meeting 274 
of the Major Risks Commission was convened, and evidence emerged at the trial to suggest that the 275 
reason that the committee had met was that public officials wanted to calm the public down 276 
following the small earthquakes and the claims, made by a technical officer (not a seismologist) that 277 
radon gas emissions suggested there would be a major earthquake. The minutes of the meeting, 278 
published by L’Espresso magazine, state: 279 
Alla riunione partecipano le massimo autorità scientifiche del settore sismico, in grado di fornire il quadro più 280 
aggiornato e affidabile di quanto sta accadendo. 281 
(The greatest scientific authorities in the field of seismology are participating in the meeting, in order to 282 
provide the most up-to-date and reliable picture of what is happening.) 283 
Thus, one of the issues that underlies the case is the construction of authority: senior scientists held 284 
in esteem by the state were asked to silence the concerns of an “amateur” – and this has continued 285 
in the aftermath (e.g. see Alexander, 2015). It is interesting to note that subsequent responses from 286 
scientists have cautioned that the case may itself lead to scientific advice being the realm of 287 
“mavericks and charlatans” who are willing to take the risk of prosecution (see Cartlidge, 2012). The 288 
responses to the verdict are also symptomatic of a defensive science that reinforces the perceived 289 
division between “science” and “non-science” as a source of authority. They were also, interestingly, 290 
almost entirely ignorant of the nuances of the local context (as described eloquently by Alexander, 291 
2014): the scientists were associated with the political ‘caste’, which is increasingly mistrusted by the 292 
population. This also emerged in the responses of other Italian scientists to the reaction from the 293 
wider scientific community. One senior scientist wrote, in an email to a global list for volcanology 294 
(“Volcanonet”) that “scientists are only able to be truly independent if they have been assigned 295 
positions purely on the basis of their scientific expertise and merit. However, if such positions are 296 
acquired based on personal bias, relationships or "association" and not on scientific competence, it 297 
is clear that the scientist loses their autonomy.” There were clearly political problems within the 298 
Italian scientific community as well as between it and other groups. This paper is not concerned with 299 
the details of the indictments or the debates that have followed (e.g. Alexander, 2014, 2015; 300 
Gabrielli and Di Bucci, 2015; Aspinall, 2011; Marzocchi, 2012). Instead, we pick up on a number of 301 
themes that are distilled from this example and from others in order to suggest a way forward for 302 
studies of scientific advice in disasters. These include the ways in which scientists involved in advice 303 
are identified, the representation of uncertainty in reporting, the social context and the governance 304 
structures involved. 305 
Table 1 presents a brief timeline of events at L’Aquila. 306 
Date Event 
October 2008 Earthquake sequence starts. 
March 2009 Giampaolo Giuliani measures elevated levels of 
radon gas and warns the authorities 
31st March 2009 18.30 Major Risks Commission meets. Some key points 
made by scientists: 
- a sequence of earthquakes does not 
necessarily constitute a precursor to a 
larger event 
- it is extremely difficult to forecast 
earthquakes 
- the only way to prepare for earthquakes 
is to focus on improving buildings 
31st March 2009 (time unknown) De Bernadinis, a public official on the Major Risk 
Commission, reassured the public that there was 
no danger and, prompted by a journalist, 
recommended his favourite wine. 
6 April 2009 Earthquake occurs, killing 309 people 
3rd June 2010 Indictments issued against six scientists and a 
local official 
25 May 2011 Prosecution commences 
October 2012 Six scientists and De Bernadinis convicted of 
manslaughter and sentenced to six years in 
prison 
November 2014 Convictions of six scientists overturned; De 
Bernadinis’ sentence reduced to two years. 
Table 1. Simplified timeline of the L’Aquila trial. Sources: L’Espresso (minutes of the meeting on 31 307 
March); Alexander, 2014, 2015; Gabrielli and Di Bucci, 2015; Cartlidge, 2011; Hall, 2011).  308 
In the rest of this paper, we approach the civic epistemological opportunities of disasters through 309 
four key themes within a co-production framework, summarised in Figure 1 – though it should be 310 
noted that there are connections and links between and within the boxes shown in the figure. 311 
Initially, we discuss the issue of “locating expertise” – the institutional and networked context of 312 
expert advisory groups in society. This is important in disasters because disasters are time-critical. 313 
There is rarely time to assemble an expert advisory group in a crisis. We use some recent examples 314 
to illustrate this issue, which ultimately concerns the ways in which science and social order are co-315 
produced around disasters. We then discuss the challenge of “representing expertise”. This refers to 316 
the ways in which science is represented to stakeholders. In particular, it examines the 317 
representation of uncertainty – a major problem at L’Aquila, for example. One of the problems with 318 
uncertainty in an acute setting is that it undermines the perceived authority of science and tends to 319 
result in the rhetoric of “objectivity”. The co-production of science and social order, however, 320 
requires a careful framing of uncertainty. Thirdly, we address the context of expertise. Much 321 
valuable social scientific research in DRR has concerned the role of local knowledge and of local 322 
perceptions of risk. Co-production and the negotiation of civic epistemological ruptures requires an 323 
awareness of the context of scientific advice, and many studies have provided insights into the 324 
integration of local and scientific knowledges for DRR. Finally, we consider the issue of “governing 325 
expertise”. When stakes are high, it is critical that experts’ positions in relation to governance and 326 
responsibility are clear. While expertise should be accountable in a democracy, it should also be 327 
protected. 328 
 329 
Figure 1. Summary of issues concerning advisory practice around disasters.  330 
The civic epistemologies of DRR 331 
In this section, we systematically review the four dimensions identified in Figure 1, using the L’Aquila 332 
example and a broad range of other examples from the literature. 333 
Locating expertise: Flexible co-production 334 
Links between scientific advice and social order in the context of disasters can be demonstrated in a 335 
number of case studies. To give an example, the shock of a volcanic eruption is all-engulfing for a 336 
community that exists on the slopes of the volcano and requires rapid and effective adaptation. The 337 
volcanic eruptions on Montserrat, West Indies, began in 1995 and continued episodically until 2010. 338 
While no lava has erupted since 2010, however, the eruptions are not considered over because of 339 
ongoing unrest (e.g. MVO and SAC, 2014). At the onset of the eruptions, locating scientific advice 340 
was a priority, yet advice that was given prior to the imminent threat had failed to penetrate the 341 
government’s consciousness: a report by Wadge and Isaacs (1988) had been sent to the local 342 
government, but was not acted upon (Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2014). This is a documented 343 
problem in volcanic disasters (e.g. Sparks, 2007; Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2011; see also Wisner 344 
et al, 2012): prior to the disaster, there may be little political will to engage with the risk or establish 345 
institutional frameworks for dealing with it (e.g. Wisner et al., 2011). In many cases, the expertise is 346 
“latent” within the scientific community and has no means to penetrate policy. Referring to 347 
Soufriere Hills and Montserrat, Fergus (2004) wrote: 348 
There is no totally satisfactory and logical explanation for the neglect of the volcano and its potential hazards 349 
except the imprecision of volcanology as a science, the ambivalence of the predictions as a result of that 350 
imprecision, and the long time-lapse between the last eruption and 1995.
2
 351 
Fergus, a former deputy Governor of the island, felt that, given the evidence – which included 352 
several seismic crises in the twentieth century – it “should not have been a secret” (Fergus, 2004) 353 
that the volcano was reactivating. The fault lay, he felt, with the lack of uptake of the Wadge and 354 
Isaacs report by the local government. Scientific knowledge was not adequately communicated or 355 
received. Thus, the eruption came as a shock to many inhabitants, and the act of coming to terms 356 
with it was essentially one of mourning and re-identification with their reshaped island (Skelton, 357 
2003; Donovan et al., 2011). The failure of scientific knowledge to penetrate planning was an 358 
obstacle to flexible and rapid management of the eruption in 1995 (Clay et al., 1999). There were no 359 
volcanologists on Montserrat itself, so scientists from the University of the West Indies, from 360 
universities in the UK, and from the Volcanic Disasters Assistance Program in the USA were brought 361 
in to provide the necessary information. Unfortunately, as noted above, there is a high level of 362 
uncertainty in a volcanic crisis, and in 1995 there was a lack of consensus between these groups 363 
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 The volcano had not erupted since settlement, in 1632. 
concerning the likely course of the eruption (Aspinall et al., 2002). This combined with a lack of 364 
institutional, legislative and political frameworks for managing the eruption, and resulted in the 365 
formation of institutions, laws and committees over a period of several years of chronic crisis 366 
(Pattullo, 2000; Clay et al., 1999). There were also differences in the pace of acquiring scientific 367 
structures (which occurred fairly rapidly) and formalising them (which took several years – the 368 
volcano observatory was formalised by government Act in 1999 and the scientific advisory 369 
committee in 2003, partly in response to fear of litigation; Donovan et al., 2012d). 370 
As noted above, critics of the scientists who were convicted in the court cast concerning the L’Aquila 371 
earthquake argued that the selection of these scientists was politically motivated, and that their 372 
political allegiances impacted their judgement (e.g. Hall, 2011). The ways in which governments 373 
select scientists are varied, but often involve informal networks, or key, government-backed 374 
scientific institutions (e.g. Jasanoff, 2005; Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2012). This snowball-like 375 
method of selection depends upon the integrity of those involved in suggesting the names of people 376 
who may be more appropriate – particularly in time-critical contexts. The source of scientific 377 
authority must also be considered: Jasanoff (2005) notes that in the UK, choice of experts may 378 
depend as much on previous service to society as on knowledge. There are also some important 379 
differences between nations concerning how authority is constructed, and this relates very closely to 380 
the accessibility of expert advice. In Iceland, for example, volcano monitoring data are publically 381 
available (e.g. Bird et al., 2008), allowing members of the public to draw conclusions from the same 382 
data as the scientists. Reports of the scientific interpretations of the volcanic eruptions were readily 383 
available online. In the UK, however, the “ash crisis” of 2010 came as a surprise for which the 384 
government was not prepared (Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2011, 2012). It instigated a “Scientific 385 
Advisory Group in Emergencies” (the SAGE mechanism) to provide advice, but the selection of SAGE 386 
members and the content of the meetings themselves were not clear nor public. In 2011, the 387 
secrecy surrounding the SAGE was criticised by the Select Committee (House of Commons, 2011; 388 
Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2012): there was insufficient clarity about the information on the basis 389 
of which decisions about volcanic ash had been taken, and a breakdown of communication between 390 
scientists and government about the risk prior to the eruption (Oppenheimer, 2010). Minutes of 391 
SAGE meetings have since been published, and a strength of the SAGE mechanism is its flexibility.  392 
These examples demonstrate that advisory mechanisms for disasters have to be both pre-emptive 393 
and responsive. There is continuous dialogue between the social progression of a disaster and the 394 
scientific advisory process, as decisions and the knowledge-claims on which they are based are 395 
questioned. Other forms of knowledge and interpretation are frequently applied in the knowledge-396 
testing process. These can include past experience, local knowledge, (post)colonial discourses, 397 
changes in relationship between people and land, people flows and networks, and cultural memory 398 
(e.g. Cashman and Cronin, 2008). All of these issues impact social and scientific knowledge 399 
production and require sensitivity (e.g. Allen, 2007).  400 
The involvement of international scientific advisors is common in seismic and volcanic hazard 401 
assessment. Examples of this include the provision of advice from Japanese scientists to Iranians 402 
following the Bam earthquake in 2003 and the involvement of the USGS Volcanic Disasters 403 
Assistance Programme (VDAP) in a number of volcanic crises, including Pinatubo (Newhall and 404 
Punongbayan, 1996), Merapi in 2010 (Surono et al, 2012) and indeed on Montserrat in 1995, albeit 405 
briefly (Aspinall et al., 2002). In each of these cases, local knowledge was combined with the 406 
experience and knowledge of the international teams in order to manage a local or regional-scale 407 
event. The presence of scientists from multiple cultures inevitably provides differing perspectives, 408 
especially if a local culture has a much greater awareness of the human geography of the region. A 409 
key lesson might thus be the importance of reflexivity in science: awareness of the potential for 410 
social circumstances or personal experience to affect risk judgements. A further, critical issue for 411 
other contexts might be the involvement of multiple scientific agencies with different structures and 412 
experiences. These circumstances require a clear, transparent and systematic approach for 413 
identifying and gathering appropriate experts in emergencies, and a flexible system for incorporating 414 
different knowledges and reaching out to different groups (Figure 1). 415 
Representing expertise: framing, objectivity and boundary work 416 
This section draws on philosophy of science and probability to examine the process of scientific risk 417 
assessment – often a key part of the advisory process. It also examines the reporting and framing of 418 
such assessments, arguing that the representation of expert advice is a key dimension of the civic 419 
epistemology of disasters (see Figure 1). This may be particularly challenging in volcanic and seismic 420 
risk assessment, because of low probabilities associated with high impacts, and disagreement 421 
between experts concerning the most effective methodology. At L’Aquila, for example, there were 422 
claims, after the event, that the methods used in seismic hazard assessment were inadequate or 423 
failed to use all available knowledge. These issues are actively debated within risk assessment 424 
discourses in both seismology (e.g. Castanos and Lomnitz, 2002; Marzocchi and Zechar, 2011; 425 
Jordan, 2013) and in volcanology (Donovan et al., 2012b,c; Marzocchi et al., 2012). Furthermore, 426 
unpopular decisions may lead to public interrogation of scientific method and the undermining of 427 
scientific advice. This occurred to a degree during civil cases brought in Montserrat in 2002-3 428 
(Donovan et al, 2012d): local people criticised the scientists because of an evacuation that lasted for 429 
nine months. This led to a civil case against the Governor of the island, and to negative relationships 430 
between scientists and society (e.g. Aspinall, 2011). Communication strategies are thus particularly 431 
important, and in a democratic society these include transparency about both knowledge and non-432 
knowledge in scientific reports.  433 
A characteristic of volcanic and seismic hazards is the high uncertainty that surrounds them. This 434 
invariably impacts the use of scientific advice – and is a critical element of its communication. For 435 
example, Haynes et al (2008) found that Montserratians were more accepting of science when they 436 
had grasped that it could not give the answers they wanted. Many decisions have to be made on the 437 
basis of best estimates, frequently expressed as probabilities. The epistemological status of 438 
probability is problematic (Hacking, 2001; Popper, 1959), but the provision of probabilistic estimates 439 
nevertheless constitutes a form of knowledge-claim because it asserts that certain events are 440 
thought to be more or less likely based on fragmentary knowledge. This liminal form of knowledge is 441 
essential in risk management: quantitative assessment greatly facilitates the monitoring of whether 442 
or not risk has increased from one period to the next, for example. Nevertheless, it also requires 443 
qualitative framing so that the claim and the reasoning behind it – the true scope of the fragmentary 444 
knowledge – are transparent (Donovan et al., 2014). This involves appropriate use of language. For 445 
example, scientific definitions tend to oppose “objective” and “subjective” in ways that are not 446 
helpful for transparency or the progression of scientific advice (Aspinall, 2012; Donovan et al., 447 
2012b): as Kuhn (1977) argued, the concepts are not opposed but rather define different ideas.  448 
Further to this, when knowledge claims are controversial, scientists may be “subjectivised” by the 449 
public – arguably a similar phenomenon to L’Aquila. Scientists may be torn between defending the 450 
“objectivity” of science and acknowledging the uncertainty inherent in the natural system. This 451 
points to two important aspects of managing non-knowledge: transparency and awareness of 452 
positionality (reflexivity; Donovan et al., 2014). Facilitating the representation of expertise within the 453 
social context is an important aspect of risk management, and involves acknowledgement of the 454 
limitations of knowledge as well as its implications. Disasters can be negotiated through adaptive 455 
methodologies for representing uncertainty and risks, and by the continued examination of claims 456 
made by expert groups. Social scientific input into the presentation and communication of scientific 457 
advice would be extremely beneficial here: the framing of expert advice is crucial in preventing 458 
situations like L’Aquila, as has been demonstrated repeatedly in Science Studies (e.g. Irwin, 2001; 459 
Miller, 2000; Hajer,2003). It would also ensure that policymakers and the public are not misled about 460 
the uncertainty in science. The importance of representing science and uncertainty accurately has 461 
been witnessed in other aspects of environmental geography (such as climate change), and human 462 
geographers are ideally positioned to carry out forensic research on past extreme events and 463 
develop best practice guidelines that are effective.  464 
Contextualising expertise: knowledge identities and geographies 465 
Civic epistemological thresholds frequently involve the management of a range of cultures and 466 
identities, all of whom are experiencing the event in different ways. This can include past 467 
experience, local knowledge, (post)colonial discourses, changes in relationship between people and 468 
land, people flows and networks, and cultural memory (e.g. Cashman and Cronin, 2008). All of these 469 
issues impact social and scientific knowledge production and require sensitivity. One important 470 
emerging method for the integration of such knowledges is Participatory Mapping (Cadag and 471 
Gaillard, 2012), and other examples are given by Lane et al (2011): local and scientific stakeholders 472 
interacting to learn from past events and prepare for the future. However, in the case of very low 473 
probability events, or those where there is a high dependence on experts, it is critical that all 474 
information is available to governments very quickly. While formal participatory methods may not 475 
be readily available, particularly in a crisis, some degree of engagement with the public is helpful for 476 
establishing both authority and accountability (e.g. Haynes et al., 2008). There are thus two aspects 477 
to this theme: the cultures and identities of experts and those of the at-risk community. 478 
Taking this further, we might suggest that the presentation and application of scientific advice also 479 
requires input from social scientific studies of risk perception and communication in these different 480 
contexts (e.g. Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Sjoberg, 2000; Slovic, 2000). For example, Gaillard 481 
(2008) noted that people living close to Mount Pinatubo perceived volcanic risks as high, but showed 482 
that in spite of this, many will take risks because they are more concerned with the daily challenge of 483 
mitigating poverty. Risk tolerability3 varies in space and time: there is too much complication from 484 
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 Risk tolerability refers to the level of risk that an individual or group is willing to accept. It has been shown to 
vary according to the nature of the risk, as well as the socio-economic status and characteristics of the 
individual or group (e.g. Aven and Renn, 2009). 
non-numerical sources such as cultural conditioning (cf Kahan et al., 2009). The implication from this 485 
argument is that risk scales4 could easily become chaotic, being socially, politically, culturally, 486 
historically and geographically specific – an example being the particular case of small islands (e.g. 487 
Pelling and Uitto, 2001; Tompkins, 2005).  Insight into the types of risks that people in a community 488 
face on a regular basis, their views about different risks and their trust in different institutions can 489 
inform risk assessments, both through addressing relevant questions and through making 490 
comparisons with well-known risks. Furthermore, they inform communication and outreach 491 
activities that help to build resilience (see for example Ben Wisner’s work on social capital in 492 
megacities, Wisner 2003).  493 
Risk-taking in a volcanic or seismic environment is ultimately a function of space and time (Massey, 494 
1999): it is human and physical, but not merely in definition; it is on the interface between human 495 
and physical in its realisation by communities and by scientists. Understanding the relationship 496 
between knowledge, expertise and experience in different cultural contexts provides insight into the 497 
risk communication process during the negotiation of disasters. Risk communication and perception 498 
studies are important in understanding the differences between cultures, and participatory methods 499 
that include scientists, officials and members of the public may be particularly important in building 500 
social relationships prior to hazard realisations (see for comparison O’Brien et al., 2008; Brown and 501 
Damery, 2002; Morss et al., 2005).  502 
Governing expertise: responsibility and accountability 503 
The previous sections have commented on the types of expertise and (non-)knowledge claim that 504 
may be made during a crisis and their relationship to specific geographies. This section returns to the 505 
issue raised in the introduction about responsibility: how is the relationship between science and 506 
society governed? Again, this is geographically defined and the level of legal protection enjoyed by 507 
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 Such as the UK Chief Medical Officer’s scale, which ranks specific values representing risks as “high”, 
“medium”, “low” etc. 
expert advisors varies around the world (Aspinall, 2011). It may also not be clear to scientists at the 508 
time of accepting an advisory role – particularly during a crisis. The complexity of governments, and 509 
the relationships between advisory structures, decision-makers and civil officials, may vary 510 
considerably with geography (Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2015). For example, while Iceland has a 511 
permanent structure for advice from scientists concerning earthquake and volcanic hazards, such a 512 
structure does not exist in the UK – resulting in the invocation of the “SAGE” mechanism in 2010 513 
(Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2012). This was effective, but took time to assemble. On Montserrat, 514 
too, the complexity of a colonial governance structure presented a challenge for scientists (Donovan 515 
et al., 2013). The UK-appointed Governor had personal responsibility for the lives of the people on 516 
the island, and in 1996 passed a law allowing mandatory evacuations. Since these evacuations were 517 
based on scientific advice and led to lawsuits, scientists had to give evidence and there were 518 
concerns about their legal status (Aspinall and Sparks, 2004; Donovan et al., 2012d). There is a 519 
balance to be achieved between ensuring that scientists acting in good faith are protected, and that 520 
there is a level of accountability.  521 
In terms of accountability, the role of scientists in a democracy has been scrutinised both in the 522 
Science Studies literature (e.g. Wynne, 1989, 1992; Shackley and Wynne, 1995, 1996; Jasanoff, 2004, 523 
2005, 2007; Brown, 2009; Fischer, 2010) and in the sociological studies of risk (e.g. Beck, 1992; 524 
Giddens, 1999). The knowledge that scientists (may) possess and that governments and publics need 525 
gives the former a power that potentially threatens the democratic governance of risks (Beck, 1992). 526 
This may be exacerbated in an emergency, when there is a clear need to identify experts rapidly and 527 
dependence on experts is very high. This can lead to blurred boundaries, since, for example, advice 528 
from a scientist that a particular area is unsafe is very likely to result in evacuation even if there are 529 
very high uncertainties – and scientists may be blamed (Aspinall, 2011; Donovan et al., 2012d). 530 
Conversely, scientists themselves may politicise their advice (e.g. Pielke, 2004). Clarity surrounding 531 
the role of experts as advisors is crucial, both for their security and for the management of post-532 
disaster criticism. 533 
Responsibility in the context of scientific advice also rests with citizens, however, since there is often 534 
a choice in buying land in known hazardous areas. This is a key distinction in hazards research, 535 
because urban development has frequently preceded the identification of hazardous areas. 536 
Responsibility in this context is intensely local. Expertise becomes embedded in new ways in an 537 
intense situation (Donovan et al., 2013). This depends in part on its role or institutional framing prior 538 
to the shock, but also on particular local political, social and scientific issues that arise in a crisis and 539 
that require flexible institutional practices. There is therefore a balance between ensuring that 540 
science is in some way accountable, and ensuring that expert advisors are legally protected (e.g. 541 
Alexander, 2014; Aspinall, 2011). 542 
Conclusions: Science Studies approaches for increasing resilience to 543 
environmental risks 544 
The focus on reducing social vulnerability prior to disasters has tended to ignore or underestimate 545 
the importance of scientific input, and to suggest that “hazard” is only the realm of scientists. Thus 546 
the traditional formulation, risk = hazard x vulnerability (sometimes with terms for “mitigation”, 547 
“capacity” and “exposure”), can result in a misleading separation of scientific and social scientific 548 
aspects of disaster research because the framing of the hazard affects vulnerability. The extensive 549 
social scientific focus on vulnerability has produced some very important results, but it has generally 550 
failed to consider the epistemological implications of disasters and the co-production of science and 551 
social order that occurs in their management. To do so requires a coherent understanding of the 552 
dimensions of civic epistemology and the ways in which scientists construct their authority – a rich 553 
field for social science. Disasters produce civic epistemological ruptures – changes in the ways that 554 
societies test and use knowledge. The relationships between science, scientists, decision-making and 555 
society clearly defined the events at L’Aquila. It is these relationships that dominate in the 556 
management of disasters, and they are themselves dependent in part on the way that knowledge is 557 
produced, tested and applied in a context of high uncertainty and short timescales.  558 
The framework presented in this paper has focussed on four dimensions of scientific advisory 559 
practice for disasters. There were problems with all of these dimensions at L’Aquila. Scientific advice 560 
was kept aloof from the public in an attempt to follow a “linear model” and the selection of experts 561 
was criticised, advice was not widely trusted, the uncertainty on the likelihood of an earthquake was 562 
not adequately or appropriately communicated, and the accountability and responsibility of 563 
different groups was not clear. L’Aquila is also an important opportunity, however, to learn from the 564 
problems that arose and to formulate strategies for the management of scientific advice in time-565 
critical contexts. We have used this example, together with other recent volcanic and seismic crises, 566 
to demonstrate the importance of co-production as a framework for disaster management, and to 567 
show some of the dimensions of the civic epistemology that this involves. The totality of disasters, 568 
particularly volcanic eruptions and earthquakes, does make them a special case – an “act” by the 569 
natural system that is identifiable in time and space but whose impacts may be much less well 570 
defined. The stakes in these circumstances can be very high indeed, but their rarity is such that 571 
preparations may not have been made in advance. Increased awareness of the complexity of the 572 
“local knowledge” and “scientific knowledge” that are discussed regularly in the disaster 573 
management literature would aid the construction of meaningful institutional practices and 574 
flexibility prior to disasters. In volcanic eruptions in particular, there will always be a high 575 
dependence on scientific advice; ensuring and understanding its reliability, authority and integration 576 
with social learning is thus of paramount importance. The role of place, spatial constructions of risk 577 
and cultural context in framing disaster risk provides a rich opportunity for multidisciplinary studies 578 
led by geographers. Human and physical approaches, though epistemologically and ontologically 579 
diverse, can be combined in the context of advisory science. However, the tendency of geographers 580 
to bifurcate in this way can also be detrimental, and this is closely reflected in the hazard – 581 
vulnerability split in DRR.  582 
In order to take DRR forward, then, it is necessary for human and physical geographers, physical and 583 
social scientists, to be explicit about their epistemological frameworks. This has been realised in part 584 
by several recent projects, but ontologically and epistemologically the two sides frequently remain 585 
embedded in their scientific or social scientific disciplinary training. Yet this is changing within 586 
geographical studies. Lane et al (2011) describe an example of this in flood risk management, 587 
demonstrating the potential for collaborations (see also Morss et al., 2005 and Demeritt et al., 588 
2010). In the context of DRR, these collaborations have to be transdisciplinary (involving 589 
policymakers, the public and NGOs) in a bottom-up-top-down approach (e.g. Wisner et al., 2012). 590 
Furthermore, the  Understanding the practice of scientific advice prior to, during and after disasters 591 
will not prevent their occurrence, but could help to ensure that they are manageable rather than 592 
crippling.  593 
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